Skepticism, rhetoric, and Nietzsche: an examination of the skeptical underpinnings of postmodern rhetoric by Patterson, Thaddeus Jay
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2004
Skepticism, rhetoric, and Nietzsche: an




Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the English Language and Literature Commons, and the Rhetoric and Composition
Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Patterson, Thaddeus Jay, "Skepticism, rhetoric, and Nietzsche: an examination of the skeptical underpinnings of postmodern rhetoric"
(2004). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 16162.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/16162
Skepticism, rhetoric, and Nietzsche: An examination of the 
skeptical underpinnings of postmodern rhetoric 
by 
Thaddeus Jay Patterson 
A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
Major: Rhetoric, Composition, and Professional Communication 
Program of Study Committee: 
Michael Mendelson, Major Professor 
Carl Hemdl 
Robert Hollinger 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
2004 
Copyright © Thaddeus Jay Patterson, 2004. All rights reserved. 
Graduate College 
Iowa State University 
This is to certify that the master's thesis of 
Thaddeus Jay Patterson 
has met the thesis requirements ofIowa State University 
Major Professor 
For the Major Program 
ii 
iii 
For my parents whose unconditional love and support made this possible. 
iv 
Table of Contents 
Introduction: Rhetoric is on the Rise, but Why? ............................................................... 1 
Chapter 1: The Hellenistic Skeptics And The Doubting of The Value of Truth .............. 7 
Chapter 2: Nietzsche's Perspectivism ............................................................................. 20 
Chapter 3: Postmodem Rhetoric and the Fulfillment of Skepticism's Promise ............. 33 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 46 
1 
Introduction: Rhetoric is on the Rise, but Why? 
Stanley Fish says that rhetoric is ascending: 
As I write, the fortunes of rhetorical man are on the upswing, as in discipline after 
discipline there is evidence of what has been called the interpretive tum, the 
realization (at least for those it seizes) that the givens of any field of activity-
including the facts it commands, the procedures it trusts in, and the values it expresses 
and extends-are socially and politically constructed, are fashioned by man rather 
than delivered by God or Nature. (Fish 485) 
With this short passage Fish explains how rhetoric is benefiting from the move away from 
absolute, discovered truth. When the givens are "socially and politically constructed," 
rhetoric, previously relegated to communicating already discovered truths, becomes the 
method of determining what is true. Under this paradigm, eventually, every question 
dissolves into a question of assumptions or givens, and these assumptions are constructed 
rhetorically as people reach agreements. Hence, questions about the core values of any field 
dissolve into questions of discourse. 
Rhetoric's Ascendancy Comes from Nietzsche's Skepticism 
But what is causing the current ascendancy of rhetoric? What is going on right now 
that makes postmodemists choose to look at the world as socially constructed? From a 
rhetorical stance, this question is asking why people are agreeing to abandon belief in 
absolute Truth. In order to answer this question, I will try to investigate the beginning of this 
movement, to see if I can understand what arguments made the abandonment of absolute 
truth persuasive. James Hikins suggests that my investigation should start with Nietzsche, 
because so much of postmodern rhetoric is based on Nietzsche: 
The theoretical beginning points for the views of all these central figures [Althusser, 
Bataille, Blanchot, Cixous, Deleuze, de Man, Derrida, Foucault, lrigaray, Kristeva, 
Lacan, Lyotard] in postmodern rhetoric lie in a particular interpretation of 
Nietzsche's theory of truth. Specifically, it is the German philosopher's purported 
Skepticism that provides these theorists with the basis for subsequent claims 
concerning rhetoric, knowledge, power, the nature of language, ideology, and ethics. 
(381 Hikins' italics) 
If Hikins is correct, then Nietzsche would be a good place to start examining the cause of 
rhetoric's contemporary broadening of scope. Furthermore, Hikins suggests that it is 
Nietzsche's Skepticism that provides the basis for postmodern rhetoric. Therefore, it is not 
Nietzsche alone, but also Skepticism, that needs to be understood to comprehend rhetoric's 
ascendancy. 
Beyond Objectivism and Relativism 
However, Skepticism is an old idea, so there must be something different about 
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Nietzsche's Skepticism to explain the widening scope of rhetoric. In the chapter of In Doing 
What Comes Naturally in which Fish discusses how rhetoric is on the upswing, he also 
discusses Skepticism, if not under that name. But a more rigorous explanation of Skepticism 
can be found in Richard J. Bernstein's Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, 
Hermeneutics, and Praxis. 
In that book Bernstein outlines a dichotomy between relativism and objectivism. For 
Bernstein, objectivism is: 
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the basic conviction that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or 
framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, 
knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness. (8) 
Whereas, 
the relativist not only denies the positive claims of the objectivist but goes 
further. In its strongest form, relativism is the basic conviction that when we tum to 
the examination of those concepts that philosophers have taken to be the most 
fundamental-whether it is the concept of rationality, truth, reality, right, the good, or 
norms-we are forced to recognize that in the final analysis all such concepts must be 
understood as relative to a specific conceptual scheme, theoretical framework, 
paradigm, form of life, society, or culture. (8) 
With these definitions, it seems clear that Bernstein's relativist and Fish's rhetorical man are 
similar creatures. But, Bernstein does not speak in favor of relativism. As the title suggests, 
Bernstein is seeking something beyond the dichotomy of objectivism and relativism. To be 
fair, Fish seems to be suggesting the same thing, although he suggests it through a refined 
understanding of relativism. 
Bernstein writes that the whole division of objectivism and relativism is a false 
Either/ Or, which he refers to as the "Cartesian Anxiety": 
With a chilling clarity Descartes leads us with an apparent and ineluctable necessity 
to a grand and seductive Either/Or. Either there is some support for our being, a fixed 
foundation for our knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that 
envelop us with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos. (18) 
Bernstein and Fish both suggest that this Either/Or is false. Just because there is no "fixed 
foundation" does not mean that knowledge is impossible or that morality is meaningless. 
Fish advances this point clearly when he discusses force: 
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That is to say, force wears the aspect of anarchy only if one regards it as an empty 
blind urge, but if one identifies it as interest aggressively pursued, force acquires a 
content and that content is a complex of goals and purposes, underwritten by a vision, 
and put into operation by a detailed agenda complete with steps, stages, and 
directions. Force, in short, is already a repository of everything it supposedly 
threatens-norms, standards reasons, and, yes, even rules. (522) 
Here Fish suggests that individual viewpoints pursued without connection to universal truths 
(what he refers to as force) do not lead to "moral and intellectual chaos." Instead, even when 
the absence of absolute Truth leaves people with only their personal agendas, those personal 
agendas already contain the values, morals, and standards that Descartes depended on. 
Uncertainty, Incommensurability, and Judgment 
This brings us back to Skepticism. Clearly Skepticism is salutary for rhetoric; but 
just as clearly, if Skepticism is perceived as leading to moral darkness or anarchy, it will be 
abandoned for the illusion of absolute Truth. Therefore, for a form of Skepticism to become 
rhetorically attractive, it must move beyond objectivism and relativism. My claim in this 
paper is that postmodern rhetoric is the result of a revival of Skepticism that moves beyond 
objectivism and relativism. Furthermore, by examining three concepts-uncertainty, 
incommensurability, and judgment-and how they operate under various forms of 
Skepticism, I will attempt to show not only how this reconstructed Skepticism has moved 
beyond objectivism and relativism, but also why this neo-Skepticism has proven such an 
attractive source for postmodern rhetoric. First, though, I will outline what I mean by 
uncertainty, incommensurability, and judgment. 
Uncertainty 
Perhaps certainty can be effectively described as a situation not requiring judgment. 
For a form of Skepticism to have the requisite uncertainty, it must eschew the need for 
universal truth and the assumption of universal truth. If a universal standard existed, then 
that standard would be the measure of the value of any idea. Whereas, without any such 
standard, human judgment is the final arbiter between incommensurable perspectives. 
Incommensurability 
Incommensurability is the idea that two systems can be constructed without any 
universal way of differentiating them. Furthermore, incommensurability can only exist if 
neither system can be understood in terms of the other, nor both systems understood in terms 
of a third. Skepticism and incommensurability are ineluctably intertwined. If all 
perspectives were commensurable, then there would be no need for Skepticism, because 
every perspective could be understood in terms of any other perspective and could then be 
judged by the standards of that perspective. However, given incommensurability, only 
judgment is left to distinguish between perspectives. 
Judgment 
Judgment is the human ability to choose among various incommensurable views, 
even when no external or objective standard of doing so exists. Only when judgment brings 
rules, values, standards, and norms to perspectives can Skepticism seem tenable. Without 
faith that human judgment (absent the assistance ofa universal standard or method) can 
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choose wisely between incommensurable perspectives, Skepticism is too unattractive a 
theory to gain the adherence of any but absolute Nihilists. Therefore, judgment is key to 
Skepticism. 
Partitio 
For the remainder ofthis paper, I will examine how uncertainty, incommensurability, 
and judgment make Skepticism rhetorically attractive, and in so doing how they bring about 
the broadening of rhetoric that Fish and others claim distinguishes the postmodem world. 
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In Chapter One, I will look at the Hellenistic Skeptics who dared to question the value 
of truth and in so doing opened the door for epistemologies that did not seek fixed 
foundations of universal truth. In Chapter Two, I will examine how Nietzsche also 
questioned the value of truth and how his perspectivism suggested that rhetoric and 
Skepticism could go beyond objectivism and relativism. Finally, in Chapter Three, I will 
examine how Stanley Fish and Thomas Kuhn make good on the promise of Skepticism and 
expand the scope of rhetoric. 
My goal in this inquiry is to critique the assumptions of postmodem rhetoric. The 
idea that the foundations of knowledge are tentative agreements and not universal truths is 
just one more tentative assumption and agreement. A better understanding of why that 
agreement has been reached is my ultimate goal for this paper. 
Chapter 1: The Hellenistic Skeptics And 
The Doubting of The Value of Truth 
Two Millennia before Nietzsche asked, "What in us really wants "truth"?" (BGE1 1) and 
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ushered in postmodem sensibility, the Hellenistic Skeptics had already decided that truth was 
not their goal. In this chapter I will examine three aspects of Skepticism that are crucial for 
rhetorical theory-uncertainty, incommensurability, and judgment-by examining the 
Hellenistic Skeptics and their challenge to truth as an ultimate value. 
In order to show how the Hellenistic Skeptics open the door for rhetoric, I must first 
define what I mean be Skepticism. Next, I will provide a brief history of the Hellenistic 
Skeptics, followed by a brief discussion of their ideas. Finally I will close with an analysis of 
how the themes of uncertainty, incommensurability, and judgment play themselves out in the 
Hellenistic Skeptics. 
1 In following with the conventions of my sources, especially Alexander Nehamas's 
Nietzsche: Life as Literature, I am abbreviating Nietzsche's works. These are the 
abbreviations Nehamas lists in the beginning of his book: 
A The Antichrist 
BGE Beyond Good and Evil 
EH Ecce Homo 
GM On the Genealogy of Morals 
GS The Gay Science 
HH Human, A 11-Too-Human 
TI Twilight of the Idols 
TL On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense (Not on the Nehamas list) 
WP The Will to Power 
With the exception of TL, I refer to Nietzsche's work by the section number, not page number. 
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A Definition of Skepticism 
Skepticism is Doubt Without the Assumption of Truth 
Nietzsche says "One should not be deceived: Great spirits are Skeptics. Zarathustra is 
a Skeptic" (A 54). But what does it mean to be a Skeptic? For many historians and 
philosophers the key element to Skepticism is doubt. Doubt has played many roles in 
philosophy, but 1 am claiming something beyond its usual extensions for Skepticism. 1 am 
using Skepticism here to mean doubt without the assumption of underlying truth. Socrates 
expresses doubt in Plato's Apology, with his claim "I am better offthan he is,-for he knows 
nothing, and thinks that he knows; 1 neither know nor think that 1 know" (64). But with his 
Forms, Socrates still believes that there is something to be known. As integral as doubt is to 
Socrates, he still believes in a Truth that can be the measure of ideas; hence, he is no true 
Skeptic. 
Another great doubter is Descartes, who says in his Principles of Philosophy, "[t]hat 
in order to investigate the truth of things it is necessary once in one's life to put all things in 
doubt insofar as that is possible. That it is useful too to regard as false those things which 
one can doubt" (qtd. Annas 8). Descartes' doubt also has a limit, though: "we should 
certainly not use this doubt for the conduct of our actions" (qtd. Annas 8). For Descartes, 
then, doubt was a tool, but continual doubt was not desired. Julia Annas and Jonathan 
Barnes state that Descartes' feelings against Skepticism go further: "Descartes saw 
Skepticism as a disease of epidemic magnitude: his whole philosophical activity was given to 
the search for a cure" (Annas 6). 
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Life Without Assumptions Impossible 
Hume, another famous doubter, echoes Descartes' idea that doubt must be divorced 
from actions, albeit more eloquently and forcefully, when he maintains that a Skeptic of the 
Pyrrhonist tradition cannot follow his philosophy in real life: 
On the contrary, he must acknowledge, ifhe will acknowledge any thing, that all 
human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All 
discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in total lethargy, till 
the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. It is 
true; so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for 
principle. And though a PYRRHONIAN may throw himself or others into a 
momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most 
trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the 
same, in every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other 
sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches. 
When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against 
himself, and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no 
other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and 
reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy 
themselves concerning the foundations of these operations, or to remove objections, 
which may be raised against them. (Hume 207) 
Here, Hume, even while acknowledging that certainty cannot be achieved, still maintains that 
doubts must cease at some point if life is to continue. Despite, then, the essential role doubt 
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played for Descartes and Hume, they both look at Skepticism negatively. For Descartes and 
Hume, doubting is necessary, but it must be limited. 
What is impressive in Hume is that even when he admits that doubts cannot be 
satisfied, he still advocates the surrender of these doubts. Leo Groarke interprets Hume as 
differentiating himself from the Hellenistic Skeptics by saying that he and those like him 
"respond to Skeptical conclusions in a different way. For though they conclude that a belief 
in the external world, the principles of reason, and so forth cannot be justified, they still 
accept them" (13). So, instead of giving up on beliefs because they cannot be proven beyond 
doubt, Hume accepts his beliefs, even while accepting his inability to prove them. 
Furthermore, Groarke says ofHume that "though he concludes that there is no way to justify 
the senses, causal inference, and reasoning in general, he still claims that ordinary life and 
human nature do not allow us to reject them" (13). Here Groarke seems to be saying that 
Hume believes that the assumptions necessary for life are true, even while admitting doubt. 
Cicero says almost the same thing in his Academica: 
For even though many difficulties hinder every branch of knowledge, and both the 
subjects themselves and our faculties of jUdgement involve such a lack of certainty 
that the most ancient and learned thinkers had good reason for distrusting their ability 
to discover what they desired, nevertheless they did not give up, nor yet will we 
abandon in exhaustion our zeal for research; and the sole object of our discussions is 
by arguing on both sides to draw out and give shape to some result that may be either 
true or the nearest possible approximation to the truth. Nor is there any difference 
between ourselves and those who think that they have positive knowledge except that 
they have no doubt that their tenets are true, whereas we hold many doctrines as 
probable, which we can easily act upon but can scarcely advance as certain. (473-
475) 
Here, Cicero continues to doubt even while he works to come as close as possible to truth. 
But, like Hume, while he acknowledges that doubts cannot be satisfied, he seems to require 
either truth or at least the assumption of truth. 
The Distinction Between Believing in Assumptions and Acting on Them 
My discussion ofHume and Cicero allows me to make a distinction between their 
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beliefs and Skepticism. I am interpreting Hume and Cicero here to be saying that they 
believe their working assumptions in everyday life are true, even when they accept that they 
cannot prove them. Instead, the Skeptics and Nietzsche can act on their assumptions without 
the belief that these assumptions have anything to do with truth. For example, Nietzsche 
says, "The falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an obj ection to a judgment; in this 
respect our new language may sound strangest. The question is to what extent it is life-
promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating" (BGE 4). 
In this quote Nietzsche clearly differentiates himself from Hume and Cicero in that he 
knowingly accepts judgments that are probably not true but that are still necessary to life. 
This seemingly trivial distinction will become more important later. 
To sum up, I am defining Skepticism as an epistemological position in which doubt 
about all things is constant. Furthermore, although Skepticism accepts assumptions as 
necessary for survival, it also involves thinking of those assumptions as no more true for that 
necessity. Therefore, with the Skeptic, the truth, previously the ultimate goal of other 
epistemologies, is now simply one of the many human measures of an idea. 
Having defined how I will use the tenn Skepticism in this paper, I would like to 
investigate its role for the original Hellenistic Skeptics. 
The Original Pyrrhonists 
My discussion of Hellenistic Skepticism will begin with Pyrrho, born in 
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approximately 365 B.C.E. (Long 79). According to David Sedley, Pyrrho's major influence 
on later Skeptics, who eventually began calling themselves Pyrrhonists, was to look at 
epoche (the suspension of assent) as a goal-essentially he was among the first to doubt the 
value of truth and posit as a goal in the search of knowledge something other than truth: i.e. 
in the case of Pyrrho, the te/os of any inquiry was ataraxia (freedom from disturbance) (15). 
Ataraxia was attained through epoche; only by refusing to decide between opposed ideas, 
could the Skeptic be free from disturbance. With his idea of ataraxia and a life without truth 
as a goal, Pyrrho was able to serve as an example for later Skeptics, despite the fact that he 
wrote nothing. Although his views were disseminated by his pupil, Timon, Pyrrho founded 
no school; so the next phase of Greek Skepticism took place in the Academy. 
Arcesilaus became head of the Academy about 265 B.C.E. and combined the rigor of 
Plato and Socrates with the ataraxia and epoche ofPyrrho. According to A. A. Long, 
Arcesilaus thought the Academy should return to "the dispassionate and undogmatic inquiry" 
he saw in Plato and Socrates. The main idea Arcesilaus takes from Plato and Socrates was 
the idea that nothing could be known for certain (Long 88-89). Arcesilaus takes this idea 
even further by adding the notion that we cannot even be sure we know nothing (Long 91). 
By combing the goals ofPyrrho with the dialectic methods of Plato and Socrates, Arcesilaus 
gave the Skeptical Academy its philosophical rigor. 
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Under Arcesilaus, the Academic Skeptics were in conflict with the Stoics. This 
conflict continued into the second century B.C.E. under Carneades' leadership of the 
Academy. Throughout the first century B.C.E., the Stoic and Skeptic traditions move 
towards each other. During this period, "the Pyrrhonist movement properly so called is 
founded by Aenesidemus, a renegade Academic determined to resist the new developments" 
(Burnyeat, "Intro" 6). Aenesidemus also added a systematic method of doubt to 
Skepticism-his famous modes of Skepticism. According to Long, "The 'modes' are a 
series of arguments designed to show that 'suspension of judgment' should be our attitude 
towards all things claimed to be real or true in any objective sense" (75). Aenesidemus' 
movement continued for over two hundred years. Then, shortly after Sextus Empiricus 
(around 200 A.D.), the Pyrrhonist tradition faded out (Burnyeat, "Intro" 6). 
The Ideas of the Pyrrhonists 
As might be expected of a "movement" devoted to disbelief and suspension of assent, 
the views of the Skeptics vary considerably. Instead of trying to examine the variety of 
Skeptical stances, I will look at two aspects ofPyrrhonist thought that anticipate Nietzsche's 
Skepticism. The first idea I will examine is uncertainty. 
Although Nietzsche seems to feel no one before him had asked why certainty was 
better than uncertainty, the ancient Skeptics not only asked that question, but some, starting 
with Pyrrho, chose uncertainty. (BGE 1) The second idea I will examine is the value of 
appearances, because both Nietzsche and the Pyrrhonist Skeptics use the idea of appearances 
to cope with an uncertain world. 
Uncertainty as Desirable 
Sedley writes, 
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What above all characterizes Hellenistic Skepticism is .. .its abandonment of that 
desire [the desire for knowledge]-its radical conviction that to suspend assent and to 
resign oneself to ignorance is not a bleak expedient but, on the contrary, a highly 
desirable intellectual achievement. (10) 
In other words, the Hellenistic Skeptics desired uncertainty. Furthermore, Sedley's 
discussion of Arcesilaus argues that although other thinkers had already used the idea of 
suspending assent, it was different with Arcesilaus: 
His [Arcesilaus's] method of including 'epoche about all things' was in essence 
borrowed from Plato's early Socratic dialogues ... Plato had harnessed his method to 
the search for knowledge, the Peripatetics had valued theirs as a rhetorical training 
device, and Protagoras had probably put his to work in support of his relativistic 
theory of truth. (Sedley 11) 
So the method of opposing arguments was not new. What distinguished Arcesilaus from the 
others was that he was only seeking epoche, the suspension of assent, not something beyond 
it. However, Arcesilaus did not invent epoche as a goal on his own. It came from Pyrrho. 
According to Long, 
the second feature ofPyrrhonism which marks its contemporary character is the 
ethical goal, 'freedom from disturbance.' No one had previously suggested that 
Skepticism might be made the basis of a moral theory. This was Pyrrho's innovation. 
(79) 
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Pyrrho's goal of ataraxia is looked at by both Long and Sedley as his key innovation (Long 
79; Sedley 15). This innovation is a very early example of questioning the value oftruth. 
With Arcesilaus, the dialectical, disputative methods of Socrates are combined with Pyrrho' s 
desire for freedom from assent, and an antilogical philosophy is formed with a goal other 
than truth. 
With epoche as the goal, incommensurability becomes possible, because epoche and 
incommensurability are more or less complementary. Put another way, with the Skeptical 
goal of epoche, incommensurability is to be desired. The Skeptical goals of ataraxia and 
epoche are only attainable if incommensurability is assumed. Commensurable theories can 
be resolved, therefore assent is not suspended-no epoche. And, without epoche, there is no 
ataraxia. So, by questioning the value oftruth and favoring epoche, the Skeptics generate a 
worldview that allows for multiple acceptable perspectives. By striving for epoche, there is 
no drive to make all viewpoints commensurable, nor is there a quest for the one universal 
standard. Nor is there despair about being unable to find the "Truth." 
But how do Skeptics operate without belief? This question brings us to the issue of 
appearances. 
Appearances Allow the Skeptics to Act Without Belief in Their Assumptions 
I have said earlier that assumptions are necessary for life and that what distinguishes 
the Skeptics from Hume and Cicero is that the Skeptics do not believe that their assumptions, 
while necessary, are either true or approximately true. One way that the Skeptics maintain 
this disparity between their assumptions and the external world is by valorizing the role of 
appearances. Long outlines Pyrrho's argument against theories of knowledge that seek to 
understand the "real nature of (external) objects." Essentially, we cannot understand the 
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external world save through our senses, and our senses provide no evidence that we perceive 
things as they really are. "Sense-perception reveals 'what appears' to the percipient; but 
'what appears' cannot be used as sound evidence from which to infer 'what is' (81-82). 
Hence, "The judgments which the Pyrrhonist outlaws are exclusively claims to know about 
things-in-themselves" (Long 85). 
The Pyrrhonist is able to survive because he has the criterion of 'the object as 
perceived' (Long 86) to make decisions with; but this object as perceived does not lead the 
Pyrrhonist to make conclusions about the real world. Myles Burnyeat writes that for the 
Skeptic, "All belief is unreasonable precisely because ... all belief concerns real existence as 
opposed to appearance" ("Can the Sceptic" 27). This comment suggests that the Skeptics 
deny beliefs, because beliefs are thought to correspond to things-in-themselves. However, 
Skeptics can still make assumptions that correspond only with appearances. 
By not necessarily thinking that their personal perspective implies the truth of their 
perceptions, the Pyrrhonist anticipates Nietzsche's argument: 
Life no argument: We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live-by 
positing bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content; 
without these articles of faith nobody could now endure life. But that does not prove 
them. Life is no argument. The conditions of life might include error. (Nietzsche OS, 
121 qtd. in Nehamas 53) 
Nietzsche here illustrates the power of appearances to enable the Skeptic to survive without 
any belief about the real world. Through appearances the Skeptic can gain enough 
understanding to make judgments while still suspending assent about the truth. Therefore, 
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the Skeptic can remain in doubt about conflicting viewpoints, yet still make decisions based 
on his or her individual judgment. 
Taken together, these ideas about doubt and appearance have implications for the 
Skeptical view of uncertainty, incommensurability, and judgment, which I will examine in 
the remainder of the chapter. 
Uncertainty 
Since Skepticism is perhaps best understood as an attack on certainty, the 
ramifications of the Hellenistic ideas for certainty are easy enough to identify. The most 
important issue, though, is that the Skeptics propose a goal for their epistemology other than 
certainty. As long as certainty remained a goal to strive for, questions would revolve around 
accuracy; but as soon as the value of certainty was doubted, other values could be 
examined-including why accuracy was esteemed. 
This aspect of the Skeptics' stance against certainty makes room for other questions. 
With truth as possible, the question asked would always be, "Is it true?" or "How close is it 
to the truth?" With truth no longer on the table, on the other hand, the questions about for 
whom something is true, why something is considered to be true, or what value there is in 
certain criteria for truth now come to the forefront. Or as Nietzsche put it two thousand years 
later, "it is high time to replace the Kantian question, "How are synthetic jUdgments a priori 
possible?" by another question, "Why is belief in such judgments necessary?" (BGE 11). 




The epoche of the Skeptic implies incommensurability. By looking at epoche as an 
end, the Hellenistic Skeptics were advocating a place where opposing arguments could not be 
reconciled or subsumed under a larger viewpoint. Multiple, opposing arguments may exist on 
every decision, and simply putting them together, as the Skeptics advocate, implies that they 
can be compared. 
Furthermore, the Skeptics believe that no universal criterion exists to differentiate 
opposed arguments, as the Skeptic argues: 
there is no intellectually satisfactory criterion we can trust and use-this is the real 
backbone of the discussion, corresponding to a modem sceptic's attempt to show we 
have no adequate way of telling when things really are as they appear to be, and 
hence no adequate assurance against mistaken judgments. (Bumyeat 24) 
But, believing that there is no certain way to protect against mistaken judgment does not 
imply there is no rational way to distinguish between arguments. A Skeptic can still act on 
assumptions. These assumptions, for example a scientific paradigm, do not function as 
universal criteria, but can and do serve as bases for personal judgments. 
Judgment 
Although the Skeptics make little explicit reference to judgment, their views on 
certainty and incommensurability make a few elements of judgment necessary. First, if a 
Skeptic looks at any issue and constructs two equally potent arguments, one on either side of 
the issue, then, of necessity, deciding between the two issues will require a judgment based 
on personal perspective. But, rather than trying to find the right answer through a priori 
reasoning, Skeptics make decisions based on their interests. In any situation with multiple 
equally-correct stances, taking a stance is a matter of saying, "Hear me! For I am such and 
such a person. Above all, do not mistake me for someone else" (Nietzsche EH I, 1). This 
feeling of power would necessarily be lacking if decisions were made based entirely upon 
timeless reasoning; in that case, the decision would not be the person's but rather would 
follow logically from the independent process ofreason alone. 
Rhetorical Implications 
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The implications of Skepticism for rhetoric are profound. With Skepticism, all of the 
big questions, such as whether a theory is true, eventually dissolve into incommensurable 
arguments, and the only way to choose between them is through persuasion and judgment. 
So, if Skepticism is accepted, all questions, be they scientific, philosophical, or merely 
practical, become matters of persuasion and judgment. 
But the Skeptics weren't rhetoricians, so the story of how rhetoric takes its place as 
the arbiter of Skeptical doubt must wait. For now, in Chapter Two, it is important to see how 
Nietzsche expands on the ideas of the Hellenistic Skeptics. With Nietzsche's continued 
attack on the value of truth as a goal for inquiry, and his more detailed approach to the idea 
of appearances, rhetoric finds a Skeptical underpinning that allows it to answer the big 
questions. In Chapter Three, I will examine how rhetoric finally begins to answer these 
questions. 
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Chapter 2: Nietzsche's Perspectivism 
To sum up, in the previous chapter I explored how the Hellenistic Skeptics doubted certainty 
and yet survived in an uncertain world through a reliance on appearances. By doubting the 
value of truth, and even positing uncertainty as a goal, Pyrrho introduced the possibility of an 
epistemology that did not seek certainty. But Pyrrho failed to convince many generations 
and his school of thought mostly died out, if only for a time. Later, Nietzsche revisited the 
doubting of truth and, by taking Skepticism beyond objectivism and relativism, made it an 
attractive epistemology on which to base a new approach to rhetoric. 
In this chapter, I will examine how Nietzsche blended the philosophy of the 
Hellenistic Skeptics with his idea ofperspectivism. With perspectivism, Nietzsche brought 
Skepticism beyond objectivism and relativism, making it an attractive epistemology on 
which to base postmodem rhetoric. In my examination of how Nietzsche's perspectivism 
makes Skepticism persuasive, I will first describe perspectivism itself and then look at how 
uncertainty, incommensurability, and judgment operate under the conditions of Nietzsche an 
perspectivism. But first, I must address the connection I am making between Nietzsche and 
the Pyrrhonists. 
Nietzsche's Connection to the Pyrrhonists 
Nietzsche is not usually connected to the Pyrrhonists; even Nietzsche thought he was 
responding either to the Sophists, who were earlier than the Pyrrhonist Skeptics, or to the 
philosophers directly before him, such as Kant. However, despite Nietzsche's lack of 
attention to the Pyrrhonist Skeptics, they are still relevant to a discussion of Nietzsche 
because, as Nietzsche writes: 
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That individual philosophical concepts are not anything capricious or autonomously 
evolving, but grow up in connection and relationship with each other; that, however 
suddenly and arbitrarily they seem to appear in the history of thought, they 
nevertheless belong just as much to a system as all the members of the fauna ofa 
continent-is betrayed in the end also by the fact that the most diverse philosophers 
keep filling in a definite fundamental scheme of possible philosophies. Under an 
invisible spell, they always revolve once more in the same orbit; however 
independent of each other they may feel themselves with their critical or systematic 
wills, something within them leads them, something impels them in a definite order, 
one after the other-to wit, the innate systematic structure and relationships of their 
concepts. (BGE 20) 
So, though no direct link between the Pyrrhonists' and Nietzsche may exist, Nietzsche and 
the Pyrrhonists independently fall into the same orbit. Indeed, at the beginning of the section 
the previous quote was taken from, Nietzsche enters the Pyrrhonian orbit: 
What in us really wants "truth"? Indeed we came to a long halt at the question about 
the cause of this will-until we finally came to a complete stop before a still more 
basic question. We asked about the value of this will. Suppose we want truth: why 
not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even ignorance? ... And though it scarcely 
seems credible, it finally almost seems to us as if the problem had never even been 
put so far-as if we were the first to see it, fix it with our eyes, and risk it. For it does 
involve a risk, and perhaps there is none that is greater. (BGE 1) 
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So, despite Nietzsche's feelings of coming up with a new question, the Hellenistic Skeptics, 
following Pyrrho, previously "put" this problem. Hence, the Pyrrhonist Skeptics are relevant 
to a discussion of Nietzsche's Skepticism because they, like Nietzsche, question the value of 




But what is perspectivism? Perspectivism claims that the lens we view the world 
through cannot be removed from the world: "The perspective therefore decides the character 
of the "appearance"! As if a world would still remain over after one deducted the 
perspective!" (WP 567). Perspectivism begins with the acceptance of the Skeptical idea that 
the senses can tell us nothing about the external world. Then, Nietzsche adds another level of 
distance between the external world and us. He claims that our language or paradigms are 
also between us and the external world: "It is this way with all of us concerning language: we 
believe that we know something about the things themselves when we speak of trees, colors, 
snow, and flowers; and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things-metaphors which 
correspond in no way to the original entities" (TL 1174). Furthermore, our values color what 
we see: "a world viewed according to values; ordered, selected according to values, i.e., in 
this case according to the viewpoint of utility in regard to the preservation and enhancement 
of the power of a certain species of animal" (WP 567). So according to Nietzsche we have 
access to only our value-laden interpretations of things and not things-in-themselves. 
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The Only World that Matters is The Apparent World 
But then, Nietzsche's perspectivism takes its most important step and avoids 
Descartes' unfair Either/Or. Rather than letting the inaccessibility of truth via the senses lead 
to despair, Nietzsche instead says that only the apparent world matters: "The "apparent" 
world is the only one: the "true" world is merely added by a lie" (TI IV, 2); "The antithesis 
of the apparent world and the true world is reduced to the antithesis 'world' and 
'nothing'''(WP 567). Here, Nietzsche is clearly saying that for all intents and purposes, the 
world of things-in-themselves does not exist or is unimportant. 
However, even Nietzsche has difficulty explaining how the only world that matters is 
the world of perspective. The difficulty occurs because Nietzsche believes that there is 
something else out there, but at the same time he is trying to say that the something else is 
inaccessible except through perspective and in itselfhas no value. Therefore, Nietzsche is 
reduced to using awkward terms, such as "center of force" for intelligent beings and 
"remainder" for the external world: 
Every center of force adopts a perspective towards the entire remainder, i.e., its own 
particular valuation, mode of action, and mode of resistance. The "apparent world," 
therefore, is reduced to a specific mode of action on the world, emanating from a 
center. Now there is no other mode of action whatever; and the "world" is only a 
word for the totality of these actions. Reality consists precisely in this particular 
action and reaction of every individual part toward the whole. (WP 567) 
Notice, the world consists of our actions in relation to the "remainder," not as the 
"remainder" or our view of the "remainder." By making the world consist of our actions, 
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Nietzsche makes it impossible to remove perspective, because in this passage, the removal of 
our interest would be the removal of the world itself. 
Perspectivism is Neither Idealism Nor Abject Relativism 
It is important to note that Nietzsche's perspectivism is neither idealistic nor abjectly 
relativistic. Nietzsche denies the world is wholly a construct of the human mind, as idealists 
hold, because that would mean that the organs perceiving the world create themselves, which 
he dismisses as absurd: 
And others even say that the external world is the work of our organs? But then our 
body, as a part ofthis external world, would be the work of our organs! But then our 
organs themselves would be-the work of our organs! It seems to me that this is a 
complete reductio ad absurdum, assuming that the concept of causa sui is something 
fundamentally absurd. Consequently, the external world is not the work of our 
organs--? (BGE 15) 
Rather the world is our interpretation of whatever else is out there. Essentially, Nietzsche is 
half-idealist, because our minds construct the world, by interpreting what we see and do not 
construct the world out of nothingness. 
Moreover, Nietzsche is not an abject relativist because the "Cartesian Anxiety" does 
not alarm him. Instead of believing the lack of universal criteria makes decision-making 
impossible, Nietzsche holds that we have never had any such criteria; rather, the sum total of 
advancement in human knowledge has come through improvements in applying personal, 
interested judgment. Hence, for Nietzsche, each attempt at universal truth, while perhaps an 
improvement over earlier attempts, fundamentally misunderstood itself. 
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Uncertainty, Incommensurability, and Judgment 
For the rest ofthis chapter I will examine how Nietzschean perspectivism relates to 
the three ideas I raised earlier-uncertainty, incommensurability, and judgment. Finally, by 
looking at these three ideas and how they relate to perspectivism, I will attempt to show how 
Nietzsche's perspectivism expands rhetoric so that it is able to examine questions previously 
beyond rhetoric's scope. 
Uncertainty 
The key element in uncertainty for Nietzsche is not that we cannot be certain-
although he still maintains that-but rather that we cannot know neutral facts: "Facts is 
precisely what there is not, only interpretations" (WP 481). For Nietzsche, perspective is 
inextricably tied to all knowledge, to the degree that: 
There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective "knowing"; and the more 
affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use 
to observe one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of this thing, our 
"objectivity," be. But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every 
affect, supposing we were capable of this-what would that mean but to castrate the 
intellect? (GMIII, 12) 
In a sense, Nietzsche is saying here that part of what makes knowledge valuable is the 
perspective it comes from, so even if we could remove perspective from knowledge, the 
knowledge left over would be worthless. Nietzsche comes back to this idea when he writes, 
"as if a world would still remain over after one deducted the perspective!" (WP 567). 
Alexander Nehamas restates Nietzsche's emphasis on interpretation: "In itself, the world has 
no features, and these can therefore be neither correctly nor wrongly represented" (45). 
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Another aspect of uncertainty in Nietzsche's perspectivism is that it allows him to 
refute Hume's idea that we must accept the assumptions we live by as true: "Nietzsche 
claims that many of our most central beliefs are false, and that, far from hurting us, these 
beliefs have so far produced some of the greatest benefits. But he never argues that their 
being beneficial makes them true" (Nehamas 55). In this passage, Nehamas points out that 
Nietzsche does not, like Hume, assume that those judgments we rely upon are true, or even 
that reliability implies truth. Nietzsche is rather saying that we rely on untruths, but valuable 
untruths. Nietzsche examines the same idea in the following passage: 
The falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an obj ection to a judgment; ... 
And we are fundamentally inclined to claim that the falsest judgments (which include 
the synthetic judgments a priori) are the most indispensable for us; that without 
accepting the fictions oflogic, without measuring reality against the purely invented 
world ofthe unconditional and self-identical, without a constant falsification of the 
world by means of numbers, man could not live-that renouncing false judgments 
would mean renouncing life and a denial oflife. To recognize untruth as a condition 
oflife. (BGE 4) 
The specific untruths Nietzsche refers to here, including numbers and logic, are areas 
previously outside of rhetoric's domain. By saying that these tremendously useful concepts 
are invented, and as such, are opinions and not knowledge, Nietzsche places them in the 
realm of rhetoric. In the same way, Nietzsche claims: "language is rhetoric, because it 
desires to convey only a doxa [opinion], not an episteme [knowledge]" (Lectures 23). By 
claiming that all numbers, logic, and language are opinions and not knowledge-in a sense 
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created fictions-Nietzsche is arguing that the most important intellectual developments of 
mankind have no connection to absolute Truth. 
All of this leaves Nietzsche with a form of uncertainty that allows for only small 
truths, truths within a perspective. For example, Nietzsche says, "If! make up the definition 
of a mammal, and then, after inspecting a camel, declare, "look, a mammal," I have indeed 
brought a truth to light in this way, but it is a truth oflimited value" (TL 1175). As in 
Nietzsche's example with the camel, knowledge can still be judged by very strict criteria, but 
those criteria are always constructed, always contingent, and always interested. Furthermore, 
those criteria are neither universal nor does Nietzsche desire that they become so: 
It must offend their [Nietzsche's philosophers ofthe future] pride, also their taste, if 
their truth is supposed to be a truth for everyman-which has so far been the secret 
wish and hidden meaning of all dogmatic aspirations. "My judgment is my 
judgment": no one else is easily entitled to it-that is what such a philosopher of the 
future may perhaps say of himself. (BGE 43) 
Additionally, among other ideas in this passage, Nietzsche indicates that judgments are not 
and should not be transferable among all different perspectives-an idea that dovetails with 
incommensurability. 
Incommensurability 
By assuming that a judgment is not for everyone, Nietzsche is suggesting that the 
incommensurability of ideas is desirable. If all vantage points were commensurable, then 
there would be no reason to have different judgments. Instead, Nietzsche makes the classic 
argument for incommensurability in "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense" by pointing 
out that there is no independent standard by which different perspectives can be judged: "the 
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question of which ofthese perceptions of the world is the more correct one is quite 
meaningless, for this would have to have been decided previously in accordance with the 
criterion of the correct perception, which means, in accordance with a criterion which is not 
available" (TL 1176). 
In other words, Nietzsche claims that no universal criterion is available to distinguish 
between different perceptions. Generally, Nietzsche combines the lack of universal criteria 
with the notion that different people have different values and qualities. For example, 
"[ w ]hat serves the higher type of men as nourishment or delectation must almost be poison 
for a very different and inferior type" (BGE 30); "Our highest insights must-and should-
sound like follies and sometimes like crimes when they are heard without permission by 
those who are not predisposed and predestined for them" (BGE 30). Therefore Nietzsche's 
perspectivism leads to a world where different perspectives cannot be judged from a 
perspectiveless vantage point, where different perspectives must and should be maintained by 
different people, and finally, where better and worse perspectives exist. But the perspectives 
are better and worse only from the vantage of another perspective. 
Judgment 
Nietzsche's perspectivism takes away any hope of universal truth by defining the 
world as perspective; nonetheless, the exercise of reasoned judgment still allows for good 
decisions to be made. For this to make sense, it must be remembered that values are part of 
perspective. With values as part of perspective, people are in control of the standards they 
use to judge things, even though they have no access to universal standards. For example, 
although Nietzsche maintains that there is no universal standard with which to judge ideas, 
he would have to agree that throughout history the idea of a universal standard has been used 
as a basis for judgment. Nietzsche would claim that this "universal standard" was only a 
construct of those who used it, but that does not detract from its value: 
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The falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to ajudgment; ... 
And we are fundamentally inclined to claim that the falsest judgments (which include 
the synthetic judgments a priori) are the most indispensable for us; that without 
accepting the fictions oflogic, without measuring reality against the purely invented 
world of the unconditional and self-identical, without a constant falsification of the 
world by means of numbers, man could not live-that renouncing false judgments 
would mean renouncing life and a denial oflife. To recognize untruth as a condition 
of life. (BGE 4) 
Nietzsche is thus not advocating the dismissal of earlier methods of judgment. He claims 
that they are fictions, but indispensable nonetheless. Nietzsche argues instead that all earlier 
methods of judgment be seen for what they are-interested, value-laden, constructs of human 
creativity. Once reasoning is recognized as interested, Nietzsche can redefine objectivity, 
not as "contemplation without interest" (which is a nonsensical absurdity), but as the 
ability to control one's Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to 
employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of 
knowledge. (GMIlI, 12) 
Therefore Nietzsche does not renounce the idea of objectivity, but only denounces what it 
was previously thought to denote-a universal or neutral perspective. Instead, for Nietzsche, 
as the previous quote suggests, objectivism is still an interested perspective, but with values 
applied consciously. 
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So, for Nietzsche, judgment is a matter of perspective, and one cannot attain a neutral 
viewpoint. However, one can improve their own viewpoint by looking at things from 
different angles and by evaluating their own values. 
Rhetorical Implications 
In order to examine the rhetorical implications of Nietzsche's perspectivism, I will 
look at Aristotle's definition of rhetoric: "Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of 
observing in any given case the available means of persuasion "(181). Nietzsche's 
perspectivism, by denying access to the world ofthings-in-themselves, modifies this 
definition, because the available means of persuasion are the only measures available for any 
idea. That is, persuasive ideas are not necessarily true, but they appear valid by the standards 
of those they persuade; however, with the inaccessibility of things-in-themselves, those are 
the only standards that apply. Therefore, Aristotle's quote, understood in the context of 
Nietzsche's perspectivism, gives rhetoric a new task: to find what means of persuasion are 
acceptable in any given field. 
For example, Nietzsche says, "It is perhaps just dawning on five or six minds that 
physics, too, is only an interpretation and exegesis of the world (to suit us, in may say so!) 
and not a world-explanation" (BGE 14). Ifphysics is an interpretation of the world, then the 
standards, methods, questions, and proofs in physics are all open to doubt. The task of 
determining these issues must take place through rhetoric. Agreement as to which standards 
apply must occur before progress occurs, but that agreement is reached through persuasion 
and judgment-not through appeals to universal, unwavering standards. 
With Nietzsche's perspectivism, the first principles of any field are temporarily fixed 
through discourse. The accepted methods of reasoning, the agreed upon starting points for 
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conversation, the definition of terms, and any other axiomatic aspect of any field depend on 
agreement reached through discourse rather than a universal standard. And according to 
Nietzsche, this agreement is reached by a negotiation between people of different 
perspectives; in other words, the fundamental questions in any field are decided rhetorically. 
Nietzsche's Place in Rhetoric and Skepticism 
In the previous chapter, I examined how by doubting the value of truth and having 
goals other than truth the Skeptics created an epistemology that set the stage for an 
empowered rhetoric. However, the Skeptics were not rhetoricians and did not cast their 
arguments in terms of rhetoric. In this chapter, I examined how Nietzsche expanded on the 
ideas of the Skeptics and made these ideas rhetorical by aligning them with his 
perspectivism; that is, when everything is interpretation, the assumptions underlying any 
rational system must be obtained rhetorically. However, despite Nietzsche's heavy valuation 
of rhetoric, he was still a philosopher and was talking about philosophy, not rhetoric. 
In the next chapter I will look at how Nietzsche's perspectivism and its ramifications 
for incommensurability, uncertainty, and judgment have played out in neo-sophistic rhetoric. 
James W. Hikins claims Nietzsche's Skepticism has had a dramatic effect on postmodem 
rhetoric: 
The theoretical beginning points for the views of all these central figures [Althusser, 
Bataille, Blanchot, Cixous, Deleuze, de Man, Derrida, Foucault, Irigaray, Kristeva, 
Lacan, Lyotard] in postmodern rhetoric lie in a particular interpretation of 
Nietzsche's theory of truth. Specifically, it is the German philosopher's purported 
Skepticism that provides these theorists with the basis for subsequent claims 
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concerning rhetoric, knowledge, power, the nature oflanguage, ideology, and ethics. 
(381 Hikins' italics) 
While Hikins gives Nietzsche's Skepticism credit for inspiring all of these figures of 
postmodern rhetoric, I will look at two other figures-Thomas Kuhn and Stanley Fish. 
Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolution explains how science works without 
the assumption of truth, and Stanley Fish examines how even without a single "true" 
interpretation of a law, the legal system can still function. Despite working in drastically 
different fields-Kuhn in science, where rhetoric was previously excluded, and Fish in law, 
rhetoric's ancient home-both have largely rhetorical explanations for the world. Moreover, 
their explanations depend on uncertainty, incommensurability, and judgment. 




So far in this paper, I have outlined how the Hellenistic Skeptics and Nietzsche doubted the 
value of truth. In so doing, I have tried to describe an epistemic tradition that accepted 
uncertainty. Furthermore, I have examined how both the Ancient Skeptics and Nietzsche 
construed the critical concepts of uncertainty, incommensurability, and judgment. The last 
chapter closed with the idea that Nietzsche's perspectivism made discourse the foundation of 
all disciplines. Consequently, with Nietzsche's perspectivism, rhetoric has a new role to play 
as the means by which investigations are conducted and fundamental decisions are reached in 
any field. 
In this chapter, I will examine how the Skepticism detailed in the last two chapters 
has been adapted to the postmodem context. I do so by examining two figures-Thomas 
Kuhn and Stanley Fish-both of whom embrace rhetoric's epistemic potential while, at the 
same time, they reject, with Nietzsche and the Skeptics, the need for certainty. 
Thomas Kuhn exemplifies how a refined Skepticism provides rhetorical answers in 
disciplines beyond rhetoric proper. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is a 
rhetorical masterstroke because it explains science, previously perceived as among the least 
rhetorical disciplines, in terms of rhetoric. Kuhn's reconception of scientific change explains 
how science progresses without any assumption of absolute certainty. In the end, his new 
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narrative of scientific progress boils down to the advancement of knowledge through 
persuasIOn. 
Stanley Fish illustrates how Skepticism has specifically affected the fields of rhetoric 
and jurisprudence. In Doing What Comes Naturally Fish argues that interpretation and law 
are inseparable. In so doing, Fish explains how the legal system works without recourse to 
certainty. 
After summarizing the main arguments of Kuhn and Fish, I will examine how their 
ideas give rise to new conceptions of uncertainty, incommensurability, and judgment and 
how all these ideas inform an approach to rhetoric which revives the values of the Skeptical, 
Nietzschean tradition. 
Summary of Kuhn 
Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions attempts to reconsider the 
cumulative theory of science, which says that science is a gradual refinement of knowledge, 
with each refinement moving mankind closer to the Truth. Kuhn's research into the history 
of science suggests a different picture. Although the cumulative theory seems to explain the 
progress of science as it appears after the fact in textbooks, it cannot explain science as it 
occurs. Only after the fact can science be seen as progressing towards truth; because until 
attained, the truth is never known; and even when grasped, what seems like truth is 
eventually supplanted. 
Kuhn replaces progressivist history with his theory of revolutions. He says that 
science advances through two distinct phases: normal science and revolutions. During 
periods of normal science, the cumulative theory of science is a relatively good 
approximation of scientific practice. In periods of normal science, scientists have a concept 
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of how the world works-what Kuhn refers to as a paradigm-and they attempt to refine this 
paradigm by gathering data and solving minor problems within the paradigm. 
However, in addition to periods of normal science, Kuhn says that there are also 
scientific revolutions. Rather than continual accumulations and refinements of knowledge, 
Kuhn argues that the biggest developments in science come from revolutions, which are 
radical shifts from one paradigm to another. These paradigm shifts arise when an anomaly is 
found in the research during a period of normal science. An anomaly is something that does 
not fit the paradigm that is being used to explain it. As scientific theories are necessarily 
incomplete, there will always be something that does not fit. In other words, "There are 
always difficulties somewhere in the paradigm-nature fit; most of them are set right sooner or 
later, often by processes that could not have been foreseen" (Kuhn 82). But sometimes the 
appearance of an anomaly will provoke crisis, especially if the anomaly prevents the theory 
from answering important questions. 
In the case of an unavoidable anomaly, a new paradigm must be constructed that 
explains the anomaly. And, here is where Kuhn's theory substantially varies from earlier 
works in the history of science. Kuhn says that the new paradigm and the old one are 
incommensurable. So, there is no universal way to prove that one theory is better than the 
other and no experiment will necessarily prove one theory superior. Kuhn even goes so far 
as to mention that the discarded theory is often better in some regards. Instead of proofs, 
Kuhn says that scientists resort to reasoning outside of either scientific paradigm in order to 
persuade the rest of their scientific community to accept their paradigm. Standards of 
judgment and acceptable proofs are part of each paradigm, so the debate must go outside of 
either scientific paradigm, because otherwise the argument would be hopelessly circular. 
Therefore, as Kuhn explains, the decision between paradigms must be made through 
persuasion or rhetoric: 
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[W]hatever its force, the status of the circular argument is only that of persuasion. It 
cannot be made logically or even probabilistically compelling for those who refuse to 
step into the circle. The premises and values shared by the two parties to a debate 
over paradigms are not sufficiently extensive for that. As in political revolutions, so 
in paradigm choice-there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant 
community. (94) 
By saying that the highest standard in science is the acceptance of the scientific community 
and by implying that theories progress through arguments over paradigms, Kuhn makes 
science rhetorical. No longer are scientific theories based entirely upon the external world; 
they are now based on arguments. However, it must be noted that Kuhn's theory of science 
does not refute the validity of science by saying it is based only upon the judgment of the 
scientific community. 
Rather, Kuhn is arguing that science is productive precisely because of the values of 
the scientific community. Of course, like other professions, scientists can be swayed by 
personal motivation; but the most consistent values in science are accuracy, honesty, 
reproducibility, and the attempt to match theories to nature. Therefore, instead of saying that 
science's goal is a perfect explanation of the external world, Kuhn says the progress of 
science is an evolution of theories: 
But need there be any such goal? Can we not account for both science's existence 
and its success in terms of evolution from the community'S state of knowledge at any 
given time? Does it really help to imagine that there is some one full, objective, true 
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account of nature and that the proper measure of scientific achievement is the extent 
to which it brings us closer to that ultimate goal? (171) 
Here, Kuhn questions the need for certainty in science and implies that all of science's 
discoveries can be explained without any need to appeal to certainty. Stanley Fish, a 
rhetorician who has taught in schools oflaw, finds that the practice oflaw is by and large 
analogous to Kuhn's description of science. 
Summary of Fish 
Fish also illustrates how Skeptical approaches that echo those of the Hellenistic 
Skeptics and Nietzsche can be used to address rhetorical issues. By examining Fish, I intend 
to show how Skepticism can explain one of the oldest domains of rhetoric, the courtroom. 
The chapter "Force" in the section "Rhetoric" in Fish's Doing What Comes Naturally 
is, on its surface, an argument for the inevitability of interpretation or perspective in the legal 
system. But, Fish's argument is relevant here because he claims that laws can work without 
their being anyone, correct interpretation. Hence, Fish's argument makes laws uncertain, 
open to incommensurable interpretations, and based on previous judgments. 
Fish begins his argument about interpretation by refuting H. L. A. Hart's idea that 
interpretation of the law by individuals is tantamount to putting a gun to somebody's head, 
since both are instances of one person dominating another. Fish explains that for Hart the 
solution to this violence is determinate rules: "Determinate, in short means settled, complete 
in and of itself, and therefore in no need of further elaboration or addition. Determinate rules 
perform as barriers or walls on which is written 'beyond this point interpretation cannot go'" 
(Fish 505). 
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According to Fish, Hart appreciates the role of interpretation but he also believes that 
as long as rules have a determinate core, interpretation cannot go beyond certain bounds. 
While Fish accepts the idea that the force of interpretation is similar to the force of holding a 
gun to someone's head ("rhetoric is by definition the forceful presentation of an interested 
argument-rhetoric is another word for force" [Fish 517]), he does not accept the idea that 
interpretation can be limited. 
For Fish, determinate rules are one more occurrence of certainty, and interpretation is 
yet another application of human judgment. Like Hume and Descartes, Hart argues that for 
the law to function, certainty is needed. Fish, however, sides with Nietzsche in saying that 
certainty is not possible, and that even without certainty laws can work. Fish's argument has 
three key points. First, he argues that each rule is just an earlier interpretation. Second, the 
application of any rule requires further interpretation, because the circumstances surrounding 
the particular application of the rule cannot be extracted from or imagined by the rule itself. 
Finally, Fish steps away from the matter of legal cases and argues that interpretation is not to 
be feared, because interpretation involves the values agreed upon by a community of 
informed citizens. 
Rules are Just Earlier Interpretations 
To begin his argument, Fish claims that rules are just earlier interpretations. He 
argues that "plain cases," which serve as examples for later cases, are only plain because the 
arguments about them have been forgotten: 
A plain case is a case that was once argued; that is, its configurations were once in 
dispute; at a certain point one characterization of its meaning and significance -of its 
rule-was found to be more persuasive than its rivals; and at that point the case 
became settled, became perspicacious, became undoubted, became plain. (513) 
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Here Fish argues that the clear precedents that Hart sees as the foundation of law are merely 
arguments that were previously decided. In effect, the foundation that Hart advocates as a 
way to avoid interpretation is only an interpretation that was so persuasive that its detractors 
have been forgotten. Fish's argument thus echoes Nietzsche's argument about language and 
truth: 
What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and 
anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically 
and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which after long usage, 
seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we 
have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have 
been drained of sensuous force. (TL 1174) 
Nietzsche is saying the same thing about truth that Fish was saying about "plain cases." In 
these similar passages, the authors are trying to explain how any seemingly stable point in an 
argument is a place that was previously unstable, previously argued, and always open to 
continual questioning. 
Every New Case Requires a New Interpretation 
Moreover, Fish says that in choosing how to apply a precedent to a pending case, the 
judge is reinterpreting and even rewriting the precedent: 
[W]hile there will always be paradigmatically plain cases-Hart is absolutely right to 
put them at the center of the adjudicative process-far from providing a stay against 
the force of interpretation, they [plain cases] will be precisely the result of 
interpretation's force; for they will have been written and rewritten by interpretive 
efforts. (513) 
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Fish agrees here with Hart: plain cases, or precedents, should be used in legal cases, but he 
disagrees with the idea that they can be used to eliminate interpretation. Fish says instead 
that each time precedents are applied the case changes to some degree. Alexander Nehamas 
interprets Nietzsche as saying something similar: 
There is therefore no question of ever being accurate or true to a text, since without 
an interpretation already in place, there is nothing for it to be true to. Furthermore, 
once an interpretation has been offered, to discuss the possibility that it is true is 
simply to produce a further interpretation ofthe text in question, which will itself 
create its own meaning for it. (62) 
Here Nehamas attributes to Nietzsche the same argument Fish is making about legal 
precedents, namely that any text is in a sense created by the interpretation of it. And, as Fish 
says, "there will be not one but many rules and no independent mechanism for deciding 
between them" (Fish 511-512). For example, Fish makes the argument that part of applying 
any precedent to a current case is to decide in what ways the precedent is similar to the case 
at hand. This, of course, remains a matter of interpretation: "resemblance and its opposite-
that is, sameness and difference-are not immanent in the object but emerge from the 
perspective of the differential criteria that inform perception" (Fish 514). 
Fish thus claims that applying any precedent is always a matter of interpretation. 
Rather than plain cases being a way around interpretation, Fish has shown that they are 
simply earlier interpretations that are reinterpreted in their present application. So in effect, 
the rules that Hart was clinging to as a way to get beyond the interpretations of judges tum 
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out to be merely new interpretations of previous interpretations. Or, as Fish puts it, "the rule, 
insofar as it is intelligible, is an extension of some interested agenda that cannot be kept out 
because it is already in" (Fish 519). 
Norms and Rules Come With Interpretation 
But Fish does not say interpretation leads to the anarchy Hart fears. Rather, Fish, like 
Nietzsche, has an expanded view of interpretation that subsumes the goals of certainty under 
the heading of perspectives: 
That is to say, force wears the aspect of anarchy only if one regards it as an empty 
blind urge, but if one identifies it as interest aggressively pursued, force acquires a 
content and that content is a complex of goals and purposes, underwritten by a vision, 
and put into operation by a detailed agenda complete with steps, stages, and 
directions. Force, in short, is already a repository of everything it supposedly 
threatens-norms, standards reasons, and, yes, even rules. (522) 
Here, Fish reinterprets the meaning of interpretation and, in so doing, addresses a major 
objection to Skepticism. Hart sees force or interpretation as irrational desires and capricious 
whims; Fish sees interpretation as value-laden. Of course Hart wants to remove from law all 
instances of jurors deciding cases on a whim, so he tries to remove interpretation, which he 
sees as based only on whim. But Fish argues that a world without absolute truth is faceable, 
because interpretation and the perspective on which it is based are replete with values, such 
as justice, honesty, and goodwill. So, although judges rewrite the precedents through their 
interpretations of new cases, and although this process will always reflect their own interests, 
part of their interest is in interpreting the precedent with justice and good will. 
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Uncertainty, Incommensurability, and Judgment 
Now I will examine how uncertainty, incommensurability, and judgment as discussed 
in the last two chapters play out in Kuhn and Fish. 
Uncertainty 
The previous sections argue that Kuhn and Fish both found their theories of scientific 
and legal reasoning, respectively, on the notion that all decisions are based on uncertain 
premises. Both Kuhn's paradigms and Fish's precedents are constructed through argument 
and rely on no higher authority than the agreement of concerned parties. Moreover, the 
application and modification of each paradigm or precedent is subject to change through 
further arguments. Distinctively, both theories avoid relying on certainty. No correct 
interpretation ofthe law or ideal paradigm in science is assumed in either theory. But, no 
correct interpretation is needed. Practitioners oflaw and science bring values with them and 
their personal interpretations are foundation enough for the advancement of knowledge and 
the governance of societies. 
Under other epistemologies, like those of Descartes or Hume, uncertainty was seen as 
an unacceptable obstacle. Without a correct interpretation of laws, how can anyone follow 
them? Without independent data about the world, how can science achieve anything? Kuhn 
and Fish show what the Hellenistic Skeptics argued: life does not require certainty. Without 
one true interpretation of law, jurors base their verdicts on their personal values, just as Hart 
would fear. But Hart failed to see that jurors obviously will value what they think the law 
means, and hence, will follow precedents. Without any independent standards for science, 
scientists create theories based upon their values, just as Descartes would have feared. 
However, scientists value reproducibility, accuracy, utility, and all of the other ideas that 
Descartes imagines could exist only with certainty; hence, theories based on the values of 
scientists function with much the same reliability as theories based on the assumption of 
certainty. 
Incommensurability 
Incommensurability is a central idea in Kuhn and Fish, although more explicitly in 
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Kuhn. Only in places where contradictory ideas are found incommensurable is there a place 
for judgment. Commensurable laws and paradigms assume a universal method of judging 
between contradictory interpretations or paradigms, but without any such method-and 
uncertainty assumes that such a method does not exist-there is no way to avoid 
incommensurability. However, as long as ideas remain commensurable, whatever reasoning 
system is already in effect will remain in place. Therefore, for Kuhn especially, but also for 
Fish, incommensurability is prerequisite for discovery and advancement. 
In other words, until a paradigm is faced with another incommensurable paradigm, no 
changes can be made to the basic foundations of a theory. Where incommensurability arises 
in the form of anomalous data and rival explanations, the values and assumptions of rival 
theories must be questioned. Without incommensurability, the only advancement will occur 
within the bounds of previous assumptions. Therefore, incommensurability is the opening 
that allows knowledge to transcend currently held assumptions. And uncertainty implies that 
all assumptions-all ideas in fact-are open for renegotiation. 
Judgment 
While uncertainty is the central idea of Skepticism, and incommensurability is the 
driving force for advancing knowledge under Skepticism, the key idea to making Skepticism 
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tenable is judgment. The greatest obstacle to Skepticism has always been its seeming 
inability to explain how good decisions are made and how judgment successfully addresses 
uncertainty. While Fish argues that interpretation or individual judgment is unavoidable in 
law, the key to his argument is showing that individual judgment need not be capricious. 
Equally so, the key to Kuhn's argument is that it explains how science advances through 
good judgments. 
Without the notion that individual judgments and interpretations contain good values, 
criteria, and reasoning, neither Kuhn's nor Fish's argument would be persuasive. Laws have 
obvious benefits and any explanation ofthem that makes them seem no different from "omni 
contra omnes" will fail to persuade (TL 1172). The achievements of science surround us; so 
any explanation of science must account for them. Judgment allows Skepticism to account 
for these achievements. Although Fish's juror and Kuhn's scientist have no access to 
universal truth, they can still make decisions based on their conception of fairness, justice, 
utility, reproducibility, and all other goals deemed crucial for good reasoning. 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that by doubting the value oftruth, the Skeptical tradition, 
in its ancient and modem forms, has made a defensible case for living in a world without 
certainty. Moreover, the Skepticism of the Hellenistic Skeptics and Nietzsche provides a 
theoretical basis for postmodern rhetoric, such as the theories of Kuhn and Fish, because 
once uncertainty is accepted, discourse becomes the basis for human knowledge. Therefore, 
rhetoric, the study of discourse, becomes fundamental in the search for answers in any field, 
and Hikins' claim that Nietzsche's Skepticism inspired so much of post modem rhetoric is no 
surpnse. 
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Finally, while an understanding of Skeptical rhetoric through uncertainty, 
incommensurability, and judgment can explain the ascendancy of rhetoric in the postmodem 
world, it also suggests new avenues of research. Judgment especially seems inadequately 
understood. The understanding and improvement of jUdgments between incommensurable 
theories in an uncertain world remains a pressing question and a promising source of future 
rhetorical research. 
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